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RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal by Errol A. Wilstead is from an Order 
of the Industrial Commission, State of Utah, dated June 22, 
1989. (R. at 766.) This court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §§ 35-1-86 and 
78-2a-32a (1953, as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR DECISION ON APPEAL 
1. Does Pease v. Industrial Commission, 694 
P.2d 613 (Utah 1984) foreclose Mr. Wilstead's advancement of 
four new legal theories on this appeal? 
2. Is there substantial evidence to support the 
Administrative Law Judge's finding of fact that no head injury 
occurred on October 28, 1986? 
3. Did the Administrative Law Judge abuse his 
statutorily mandated discretion in choosing not to submit this 
matter to a medical panel? 
4. Is Mr. Wilstead entitled to temporary 
partial disability benefits? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Action. 
On this appeal Mr. Wilstead claims to be entitled 
to permanent total disability benefits as the result of an 
alleged industrial accident in which Mr. Wilstead claims to 
have injured his head. 
B. Disposition Below. 
On March 27, 1989, the Administrative Law Judge, 
Timothy C. Allen, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and an Order denying Mr. Wilstead's claim. (R. at 756.) 
(Attached hereto as Exhibit"A.M) On April 7, 1989, acting pro 
se, Mr. Wilstead filed a Motion for Review. (R. at 765.) 
(Attached hereto as Exhibit "B.") On June 22, 1989, the 
Industrial Commission unanimously affirmed the Administrative 
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Law Judge's denial of Mr. Wilsted's claims. (R. at 766.) 
(The Industrial Commission's Order denying Mr. Wilstead's 
Motion for Review is attached hereto as Exhibit "C") 
Mr. Wilstead then filed a Petition for Review with this court 
on July 21, 1989. (R. at 768.) On August 18, 1989, 
respondents filed a Motion for Summary Disposition which was 
denied on September 25, 1989. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. On October 6, 1988, Mr. Wilstead filed an 
Application for Hearing claiming to be entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits. (R. at 31.) An evidentiary hearing was 
held before Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen on 
March 16, 1989. (R. at 52-176.) 
2. Mr. Wilstead testified that he has suffered 
from numerous injuries and pre-existing conditions. His 
first serious industrial injury occurred in 1967 when a large 
rock fell on his head while he was employed by Martin 
Construction. (R. at 757.) He eventually underwent a 
laminectomy at the L4 level of the low back. Id. In 1975, 
Mr. Wilstead fractured his L-l vertebrae while working in a 
coal mine for Peabody Coal. Id. In 1979, Mr. Wilstead 
again injured his back while working for U.S. Fuel. The day he 
returned to work he was involved in yet another industrial 
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injury, resulting in time loss until February, 1980. (R. at 
757.) 
3. As a result of his various industrial 
injuries, Mr. Wilstead filed an application for hearing. A 
workers' compensation settlement was eventually reached whereby 
Mr. Wilstead received benefits pursuant to a 20% permanent 
partial impairment rating. (R. at 757.) Medical records 
collected at that time showed that Mr. Wilstead had a nervous 
breakdown in February of 1979, (R. at 370) and had a 
psychiatric consultation with Dr. McCann in January of 1980. 
(R. at 372.) Dr. McCann felt that the psychophysiological 
aspects to Mr. Wilsteadfs pain were marked. Id. 
Mr. Wilstead also testified that he has had weekly headaches 
since 1975. (R. at 140, 163.) 
4. In approximately 1983, Mr. Wilstead 
purchased his own 18-wheeler truck and began working as an 
owner/operator truck driver. Mr. Wilstead was driving for 
respondent West Way Motor Freight Company on the date of the 
alleged accident. 
5. Mr. Wilstead testified that on October 28, 
1986, the date of the alleged injury, he slipped and fell while 
at the Roadrunner truck stop in Phoenix, Arizona. (R. at 
40.) He claimed that he hit his back on the fuel island curb. 
Id. 
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6. Approximately two days after the alleged 
incident, Mr. Wilstead went to the Palo Verde Hospital in 
Blythe, California. (R. at 97.) He claimed that he informed 
hospital personnel of a head injury in addition to his back 
injury. (R. at 133-134.) However, medical records from the 
Palo Verde Hospital contain no mention whatsoever of any 
head injury or headache complaints. (R. at 729-732.) Rather, 
the medical records indicate only that Mr. Wilstead 
complained of back pain. Mr. Wilstead was told to take hot 
baths and seek rest. (R. at 731.) 
7. Mr. Wilstead sought further treatment from 
a chiropractor, Dr. Ronald Sanders, on November 11, 1986. 
Mr. Wilstead testified that he fully informed Dr. Sanders of 
his alleged head injury and ensuing headaches. (R. at 135.) 
Dr. Sanders' medical records, however, indicate only that 
Mr. Wilstead complained of back pain. (R. at 595.) There 
was no mention of any alleged head injury. (R. at 594-595.) 
8. Despite the fact that Mr. Wilstead 
allegedly had a very tender, four- to five-inch swollen area 
on the back of his head and testified that he told his medical 
providers about this injury, medical records from the Palo 
Verde Hospital and Dr. Sanders do not contain any mention of 
this bump. (R. at 594, 729.) 
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9. Following the alleged industrial accident, 
Mr. Wilstead continued to work until he quit his job in late 
December, 1986. (R. at 330, 343.) Thereafter, he began 
driving for Valley Transport of Huntington, Utah. (R. at 
687-689.) Mr. Wilstead testified that he earned $6,606.00 
per month during this period. (R. at 340.) 
10. The next pertinent medical record is from 
Dr. David V. Collins, dated December 29, 1986. (R. at 
648-650.) Mr. Wilstead consulted Dr. Collins at the Castle 
View Hospital complaining of chest and left arm pain. Id. 
Again, there is no mention of any claimed head injury or 
headaches. Id. In fact, following a thorough physical 
examination, Dr. Collins indicated that Mr. Wilstead1s "head 
is normal without evidence of trauma." (R. at 649.) 
Dr. Collins' diagnosis was that of "[p]ossible psychiatric 
consultation with an eye to intervention with relaxation 
techniques." (R. at 648.) Dr. Collins1 also reported that 
Mr. Wilstead was experiencing extreme anxiety concerning his 
"impending bankruptcy." (R. at 648, 650.) At the hearing, 
however, Mr. Wilstead denied being in financial trouble. (R. 
at 136-137.) 
11. Mr. Wilstead testified that on February 13, 
1987, he had a "sudden stabbing pain on the right side of his 
head behind his right eye which was accompanied with . . . 
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numbness." (R. at 758.) Mr. Wilstead went to the Lincoln 
County Memorial Hospital in Troy, Missouri, where he saw 
Dr. Shah. (R. at 673.) Dr. Shah's diagnosis was anxiety 
neurosis and he recommended that Mr. Wilstead decrease 
caffeine intake. Id. This is the first time the medical 
records mention any significant headache complaints. 
12. Mr. Wilstead next consulted Drs. Matsuo 
and Heilbrun at the University of Utah Hospital on April 18, 
1987. (R. at 687 & 758.) Dr. Matsuo's contemporaneously 
recorded office notes are significantly damaging to 
Mr. Wilstead's credibility. In conflict with his present 
story, Mr. Wilstead told Dr. Matsuo that his headache 
episodes began on February 13, 1987, while he was driving 
truck in Missouri (for Valley Transport, a different 
employer). (R. at 687-689.) In addition, Mr. Wilstead 
denied his history of past headaches to Dr. Matsuo. (R. at 
699.) Drs. Matsuo and Heilbrun concluded that there was 
no pathological basis for Mr. Wilstead's headaches. (R. at 
708.) In sum, the University's neurology department was unable 
to determine the etiology of Mr. Wilstead's headaches. Id. 
13. Mr. Wilstead returned to Dr. Sanders in 
April, 1987. In a questionnaire asking about "recent falls" 
Mr. Wilstead personally wrote down the following: "Pain in 
right temporal and pain behind right eye, February 13, 1987, 
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pain started immediate [sic]." (Medical R. at 596,,) At this 
time Dr. Sanders began pressing Mr. Wilstead for payment of 
the chiropractic services. It was at this time that 
Mr. Wilstead first supplied Dr. Sanders with the netme of 
his former employer, West Way Motor Freight Company. 
14. On September 30, 1987, Mr. Wilstead1s wife 
telephoned Dr. Sanders' office in an attempt to determine 
whether her husband's headaches could be tied or connected to 
the alleged accident of October 28, 1986. Dr. Sanders' medical 
records state as follows: 
I talked to [Errol Wilstead's wife] 
today. . . . She was wanting to find out 
if anything was mentioned about the head 
pain when he came in for his industrial 
injury in November of [1986]. I told her 
that no complaint was mentioned relating to 
a head injury and I told her it didn't look 
like [the Wilsteads] would be able to tie 
the headaches to [Mr. Wilstead's] 
industrial accident. 
(R. at 588.) 
15. Approximately a year an one-half after the 
alleged accident, Mr. Wilstead testified that he began having 
out-of-body experiences or "flash backs" whereby he "saw" 
himself striking his head in a second fall that occurred 
earlier the same evening. (R. at 89, 90, 223, 235, 322-323.) 
In other words, Mr. Wilstead cannot actually remember hurting 
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his head, but through his "flash backs," he is able to 
remember. (R. at 234, 322-323.) 
16. On June 13, 1988, Mr. Wilstead underwent a 
neuropsychological examination performed by Dennis M. Fagan, 
Ph.D. Dr. Fagan saw Mr. Wilstead's problems "as 
primarily medical/psychiatric in nature with no further need 
for neuropsychological intervention." (R. at 499.) 
17. On June 15, 1988, Mr. Wilstead underwent a 
comprehensive psychiatric evaluation performed by Dr. Eugene R. 
Aimer. (R. at 383.) Dr. Aimer believed that 
Mr. Wilstead's psychiatric condition was longstanding and 
chronic. (R. at 398.) He indicated that Mr. Wilstead tends 
to magnify his symptoms and is currently trying to repeat his 
previous attempts to receive disability benefits: 
Some thought needs to be given to the 
matter of symptom magnification syndrome, 
or the professional patient syndrome, 
especially in light of the fact of the 
history that he previously went through all 
of the present maneuvers a year ago and was 
turned down by the Workers1 Compensation, 
Social Security disability, and Utah State 
Welfare. Once he had exhausted all these 
efforts, he turned his energies in the 
direction of going back to work which he 
did for several years. Now we are back to 
repeating the same pattern of behavior, 
however, on this occasion with more gusto 
and determination to the point that if he 
doesn't get what he wants, that he's going 
to carve up and cripple a few people [and 
then] he will be returning north via the 
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use of various different vehicles so he 
cannot be caught. [Emphasis supplied.] 
(R. at 401.) 
18. Dr. Aimer also noted Mr. Wilstead's perpetual 
tendency to give inconsistent stories depending on the audience: 
There are quite a number of different 
variations of history given to different 
examiners in regard to the head injuries, 
back injuries, weakness of the left side of 
his body, and when the various symptoms 
began. To begin with, there was no head 
injury and this comes up in the medical 
records later. Then just recently, not 
only was there one head injury, but now 
there were two head injuries that occurred 
the same night. How long will it be before 
we go on to the story of three head 
injuries occurring the same night? . . . 
The purpose of mentioning this is that the 
sine quo non [sic] symptom of 
pathological exaggeration (malingering) is 
different histories to different 
examiners. [Emphasis supplied.] 
(R. at 402.) 
19. Most importantly, Dr. Aimer specifically 
rejected Dr. Bushnell's opinion that Mr. Wilstead's 
complaints could be caused by the alleged accident: 
What does need to be questioned here is the 
expressed etiology of the organic effective 
syndrome. Dr. Bushnell felt that 
[Mr. Wilstead] had a brain concussion in 
October of 1986. Usually a brain 
concussion and its symptoms last for a few 
weeks; sometimes in extreme cases, it can 
last for up to twelve months. Within the 
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realm of known medical knowledge, there is 
no such thing as depression or anxiety 
secondary to a brain concussion beyond 
twelve months, [Emphasis supplied.] 
(R. at 403.) 
20. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, 
the Administrative Law Judge asked Mr. Wilstead's counsel if 
he had additional witnesses. (R. at 169.) Mr. Trease 
responded: "No, Your Honor, we'd submit it." Id. On this 
appeal, however, Mr. Wilstead makes the claim that the 
Administrative Law Judge abused his discretion by relying on 
Mr. Wilstead's exclusive testimony. (Appellant's Brief, p. 
14.) 
21. Following Mr. Wilstead's testimony, the 
Administrative Law Judge heard closing arguments from counsel. 
Mr. Wilstead's attorney acknowledged that the medical records 
speak for themselves and expressly asked the Administrative Law 
Judge to resolve the medical conflicts: 
Once again, because of the fact that the 
medical records are so extensive, I 
believe it's best just to allow the Court 
to resolve that. . . . Those reports, 
themselves, are divergent between what the 
two doctors are saying. [Emphasis 
supplied.] 
(R. at 171.) In light of Mr. Wilstead's claim on appeal that 
the Administrative Law Judge should have convened a medical 
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panel, it is critical to note that Mr. Wilstead's counsel 
did not request a medical panel. 
22. After hearing all of the foregoing evidence 
and reviewing the voluminous medical and accident records on 
file, the Administrative Law Judge determined that 
Mr. Wilstead had not sustained his burden of proving that his 
alleged psychiatric and/or neurological problems were in any 
way related to the alleged industrial injury. (R. at 759, 
762-763.) 
23. In support of his decision, the 
Administrative Law Judge drafted very detailed and 
well-supported Findings of Fact. Pertinent to this appeal, the 
Administrative Law Judge entered the following Findings of Fact: 
(1) That Mr. Wilsteadfs sworn deposition 
testimony conflicted with his 
testimony at the evidentiary hearing 
(R. at 758); 
(2) That Mr. Wilstead gave numerous 
conflicting accounts of his 
symptomology to various doctors (R. at 
758-763); 
(3) That Mr. Wilsteadfs "flashback" 
story was not supported by the 
preponderance of medical evidence 
(R. at 759-762); 
(4) That Mr. Wilstead's "headaches" 
began on February 13, 1987, while he 
was employed by a different employer 
(R. at 763); 
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(5) That Mr. Wilstead's "headaches" were 
not caused by the industrial accident 
(R. at 763); and 
(6) That the opinions of Drs. Kotrady 
and Bushnell were based on 
Mr. Wilstead's noncredible history 
and, therefore, that those medical 
opinions were to be viewed with 
skepticism (R. at 763). 
In sum, the Administrative Law Judge found that no head injury 
occurred on October 28, 1986. (R. at 756-763.) Accordingly, 
the Administrative Law Judge denied Mr. Wilstead's claim. 
(R. at 763.) 
24. On April 7, 1989, Mr. Wilstead filed a 
Motion for Review in which he claimed to be entitled to 
permanent total disability benefits based on the opinion of 
Dr. Bushnell. However, he failed to set forth any specific 
allegations of error. (R. at 765.) 
25. Respondents West Way Motor Freight Company 
and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company were not provided a copy 
of Mr. Wilstead's Motion for Review, and accordingly, did not 
have an opportunity to submit a memorandum in response. 
Despite having only one side of the story, the Industrial 
Commission unanimously affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's 
denial of Mr. Wilstead's claim. (R. at 766-767.) This 
appeal followed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Administrative Law Judge found that no head 
injury occurred on October 28, 1986. A review of the 
testimonial and medical evidence will show that this finding 
of fact is overwhelming supported by the record below. This is 
the threshold finding upon which Mr. Wilstead's entire 
claim rests. Without directly challenging this finding, 
Mr. Wilstead now asserts that the Administrative Law Judge 
erred by resolving this case against him. 
At the evidentiary hearing Mr. Wilstead was 
represented by different counsel. When asked if there were 
additional witnesses, Mr. Wilstead's counsel said '"No, Your 
Honor, wefd submit it." (R. at 169.) In closing argument, Mr. 
Wilstead's prior counsel expressly asked the Administrative 
Law Judge to resolve the arguably conflicting medical evidence; 
he did not ask that the matter be submitted to a medial panel. 
In the face of what transpired below, Mr. Wilstead 
obtained new counsel and now advances four new legal theories, 
none of which were contained in Mr. Wilstead's Motion for 
Review. The holdings of three recent Utah decisions establish 
that Mr. Wilstead has waived the right to advance these 
theories on this appeal. Pease v. Industrial Comm'n., 694 
P.2d 613 (Utah 1984); Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales v. 
Industrial Comm'n., 681 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1984); USX Corp. 
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v. Industrial Comm'n., 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 83, (Ct. App. 
1989) . 
Finally, Mr. Wilstead claims to be entitled to 
temporary partial disability benefits. Given that 
Mr. Wilstead continued to work following the alleged accident 
and testified that he earned wages far exceeding the State 
Average Weekly Wage, and in light of an unambiguous reading of 
the temporary partial disability statute, this claim is wholly 
without merit. 
A R G U M E N T S 
POINT I 
MR. WILSTEAD'S ADVANCEMENT OF FOUR NEW LEGAL 
THEORIES ON THIS APPEAL IS FORECLOSED BY 
UNAMBIGUOUS UTAH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT. 
On this appeal, Mr. Wilstead asserts four new legal 
theories. First, he asserts that the Administrative Law 
Judge sidestepped his discretionary prosecutorial function. 
(Respondents1 Brief, p. 11.) Second, he asserts that the 
Administrative Law Judge should have convened a medical panel. 
(Respondents1 Brief, p. 16.) Third, Mr. Wilstead suggests 
that his alleged "organic brain syndrome11 might have been 
caused, not by a blow to his head as contended below, but 
rather, by falling on his tailbone. Fourth, he claims to be 
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entitled to temporary partial benefits. These theories were 
not advanced before the Administrative Law Judge and are not 
contained in Mr. Wilstead's Motion for Review. (R. at 52-176, 
765.) It is also significant that respondents did not have an 
opportunity below to defend against these legal theories. As 
such, Mr. Wilstead has waived his right to raise these 
theories on appeal. Pease v. Industrial Comm'n., 694 P.2d 
613, 616 (Utah 1984). 
In Pease, an employer was found personally liable 
for workers' compensation benefits. Id. at 614. A Motion 
for Review of sorts was filed, but no specific errors were 
specified or alleged. Id. at 615. On appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court, the employer argued that the Industrial 
Commission failed to provide proper notice of hearing. Id. 
The employer also argued that the Industrial Commission's 
Findings of Fact were insufficient as a matter of law. Id. 
In a unanimous decision the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the employer's failure to raise these issues in his Motion 
for Review was fatal: 
In filing the "motion for review" under 
§ 35-1-82.53, Mr. Pease had the 
obligation to raise all the issues that 
could have been presented at that time, and 
those issues not raised were waived. . . . 
Mr. Pease also argues that the finding 
. . . is inadequate . . . . However, he 
-16-
also failed to raise that issue on the 
motion for review and therefore waived it. 
Pease, 694 P.2d at 616 (citations omitted). See also 
Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial Comm'n., 681 
P.2d 1244, 1249 (Utah 1984); USX Corp. v. Industrial 
Commfn., 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 83, 88 (Ct. App. 1989). 
In the case at hand, Mr. Wilstead filed a Motion 
for Review contending that he was permanently totally 
disabled. Mr. Wilstead's entire Motion for Review states 
as follows: 
Because I am totaly [sic] disabled 
because of Brain Damage - Diagnosed by 
Dr. Lowery Bushnell, Director of 
Western Institute of neurophsiciaty [sic] 
- University of Utah. And presently under 
Dr. Bushnells [sic] care. Dr. Bushnell 
has told me I am totaly [sic], 
permanently Disabled. 
(R. at 765.) 
Based on Mr. Wilstead1s failure to allege in his 
Motion for Review the errors that he now contends merit 
reversal, Mr. Wilstead has waived his right to raise these 
points on appeal. Pease, 694 P.2d at 616. In addition, it 
is important that Mr. Wilstead was represented by counsel 
before the Industrial Commission and that Mr. Wilsteadfs 
counsel did not ask that this matter be submitted to a medical 
panel. (R. at 171.) In fact, Mr. Wilsteadfs counsel 
-17-
expressly asked the Administrative Law Judge to resolve the 
conflicting medical evidence. Id. In this situation, 
Mr. Wilstead has waived the right to contest the Administrative 
Law Judge's conclusions. Pease, 694 P.2d at 616. 
In support of the proposition that this court should 
review his new legal theories, Mr. Wilstead encourages this 
court to accept two noncontroiling California civil decisions 
and dicta from a 1932 Utah decision. (Appellant's Brief, p. 
15.) At the same time, Mr. Wilstead ignores entirely the 
three recent Utah decisions directly on point. Pease, 694 
P.2d at 616; Rhodes, 681 P.2d at 1249; and USX Corp., 119 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 88. These decisions overrule the dicta 
contained in Stanley v. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 228, 8 
P.2d 770 (1932). In addition, the Stanley court never 
reached the waiver issue and expressly held that the Industrial 
Commission did not err in refusing to grant the injured 
worker's request for rehearing. Stanley, 8 P.2d at 771. 
Respondents respectfully submit that this court 
should find Pease, Rhodes, and USX dispositive of 
this entire appeal. However, to demonstrate that his newly 
raised legal theories are without merit, the remainder of 
respondents' argument will address Mr, Wilstead's claims on 
their merits. 
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POINT II 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In his Statement of the Issues, Mr. Wilstead claims 
that the Administrative Law Judge erred by failing to 
convene a medical panel, by relying on Mr. Wilsteadfs own 
testimony and by not awarding temporary partial benefits. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 2.) Mr. Wilstead then mistakenly 
claims that this entire appeal involves pure questions of law 
to which the "correction-of-error" standard of review applies. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 14.) 
In contrast to what Mr. Wilstead contends, this 
appeal involves the Administrative Law Judge's finding that no 
head injury occurred. (R. at 762, 763.) This finding is 
definitely a finding of fact and is the threshold finding upon 
which Mr. Wilstead's entire claim rests. The standard of 
review applicable to this finding is addressed below. 
Mr. Wilstead's "medical panel" claim involves a mixed 
question of law and fact, requiring a different standard of 
review on appeal. His final claim regarding temporary partial 
benefits involves a pure question of law, requiring yet another 
standard of review. Each of these standards is addressed below. 
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A. Standard of Review for Findings of Fact, 
Because Mr. Wilstead's application for hearing was 
filed after January 1, 1988, the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act ("UAPA") applies to this case. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-22(l) (Repl. 1989), (R. 31). In Grace 
Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
this court interpreted UAPA and held that an agency's 
findings of fact will be affirmed unless the appellant bears 
the burden of proving that the findings are not "'supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court.1" Id. at 67 (quoting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1988)). 
[A] party challenging [an agency's] 
findings of fact must marshall all of 
the evidence supporting the findings and 
show that despite the supporting facts, and 
in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence. . . . 
In undertaking such a review, this 
court will not substitute its judgment as 
between two reasonably conflicting views, 
even though we may have come to a different 
conclusion had the case come before us for 
de novo review. It is the province of the 
[agency], not appellant courts, to resolve 
conflicting evidence, and where 
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from 
the same evidence, it is for the [agency] 
to draw the inferences. 
-20-
Grace Drilling/ 776 P.2d at 68 (citations omitted) (emphasis 
in original). 
This court must also survey the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Industrial Commission's findings. 
Chadwick v. Industrial Comm., 572 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 
1977) (citing Garner v. Hecla Mining Co., 19 Utah 2d 367, 
431 P.2d 794 (1967)). As a corollary to this rule, the 
reviewing court must presume that the Industrial Commission 
believed the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting 
those findings. IGA Food Fair v. Martin7 584 P.2d 828, 829 
(Utah 1978) (citing Jensen v. U.S. Fuel Co./ 18 Utah 2d 414, 
415, 424 P.2d 440, 441 (1967)). 
In the present case, the Administrative Law Judge's 
Findings of Fact were expressly and amply supported by a 
lengthy recitation of medical and testimonial evidence. 
Because of the Administrative Law Judge's careful consideration 
of all of the evidence, respondents submit that Mr. Wilstead 
has failed to sustain his burden of proving that the 
Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact are without 
substantial support in the record. 
B
« Standard of Review for Mixed Questions of Law 
and Fact. 
Mr. Wilstead's allegation that the Administrative 
Law Judge abused his discretion in choosing not to convene a 
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medical panel involves the application of rules of law to basic 
facts. (Appellants' Brief, p. 2.) This is a mixed question of 
law and fact. Utah Dept. of Admin. Servs. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n., 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983). 
In Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review, 
775 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this court addressed the 
proper standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact. 
This court adopted the existing intermediate standard in which 
appellate review is limited to determining whether the agency's 
application of its factual findings to the law exceeded the 
bounds of reasonableness and rationality. Id. at 442. 
C. Standard of Review for Questions of Law. 
Finally, Mr. Wilstead claims that the Administrative 
Law Judge erred in failing to award temporary partial 
benefits. (Appellants1 Brief, p. 2.) As suggested by 
Mr. Wilstead, this is a pure question of law to which this 
court must apply a "correction-of-error" standard of review. 
POINT III 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDING THAT 
MR. WILSTEAD DID NOT INJURE HIS HEAD IS SUPPORTED 
BY THE OVERWHELMING PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. 
The Administrative Law Judge specifically found that 
Mr. Wilstead had not sustained a head injury: 
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[Mr. Wilstead's] representation that he 
was having headaches in October and 
November of 1986, due to a head injury on 
October 28, 1986, is not supported by [the] 
preponderance of the medical evidence on 
the file. Rather, the preponderance of 
medical evidence supports a finding that 
the applicant had a sudden onset of right 
temporal pain on February 13, 1987, and 
that those headaches had as their most 
likely source anxiety and stress. 
(R. at 762, 763.) 
In support of his conclusion, the Administrative Law 
Judge drafted extremely detailed and thorough Findings of 
Fact. Rather than reiterate what the Administrative Law Judge 
stated in his Order, respondents encourage this court to review 
the Findings of Fact entered below. (R. at 756-763.) In 
arriving at his conclusion, the Administrative Law Judge 
considered (1) Mr. Wilstead's inconsistent and conflicting 
testimony (R. at 53-175, 205-265, 267-363); (2) the medical 
reports of Dr. Aimer (R. at 383-488), Dr. Fagan (R. at 
490-540), Dr. Bushnell (R. at 542-555), Dr. Ravsten (R. at 
557-565), Dr. Kirkpatrick (R. at 568-581), Dr. Sanders (R. at 
583-607), Dr. Kotrady (R. at 609-617, 655-658), Dr. Tedrow 
(R. at 619-621), Dr. Powell (R. at 624-642), Dr. Ramirez (R. 
at 645-646), Dr. Collins (R. at 648-650), Dr. Shaw (R. at 
673-675), Dr. Heilbrun (R. at 707-708), Dr. Matsuo (R. at 
724-726); and (3) medical records from the Flagstaff Medical 
Center (R. at 667-671), the Lincoln County Hospital (R. at 
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673-675), the University of Utah Medical Center (R. at 
677-726), the Castleview Hospital (R. at 645-665), the Palo 
Verde Hospital (R. at 728-732) and Holy Cross Hospital (R. at 
734-755). Based on the Administrative Law Judge's thoughtful 
and thorough consideration of all evidence presented, his 
conclusion that no head injury occurred is supported by 
"substantial evidence." Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68. 
In its Order denying Mr. Wilstead's Motion for 
Review, the Industrial Commission found that "the only issue on 
review [was] whether the Administrative Law Judge correctly 
assessed the evidence with respect to the alleged head injury 
on October 28, 1986." (R. at 766.) In support of the 
Administrative Law Judge's conclusion, the Industrial 
Commission stated as follows: 
The Administrative Law Judge found that 
[Mr. Wilstead's] testimony regarding the 
head injury was not credible because of 
internal inconsistencies in the testimony 
and also because the testimony was not 
consistent with medical records for the 
treatment [Mr. Wilstead] received 
contemporaneously with the October 28, 1986 
fall. 
* * * 
The Commission prefers to defer to the 
Administrative Law Judge in credibility 
questions because the Administrative Law 
Judge has the opportunity to assess the 
applicant's demeanor while testifying 
. . . Finally, the Commission finds that 
the medical evidence in this case is 
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conflicting with respect to whether the 
alleged injury could possibly medically 
cause the applicant's current psychiatric 
and/or neurological problems. 
(R. at 766-767 (emphasis supplied).) Both the Administrative 
Law Judge and, on review, the Industrial Commission, took into 
account the entire record. Based on this record, the 
Administrative Law Judge and the three Industrial Commissioners 
determined that Mr. Wilstead's injury did not occur as 
alleged. This finding is supported by the preponderance of 
evidence and, accordingly, must be sustained on this appeal. 
POINT IV 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE PROPERLY 
RESOLVED THE CONFLICTING MEDICAL EVIDENCE. 
Mr. Wilstead's chief argument on appeal is that the 
Administrative Law Judge "clearly abused his discretion in 
failing to seek competent and qualified advice on the subject 
of organic brain disorders." (Appellant's Brief, p. 18.) 
Mr. Wilstead's entire case relies on the opinions of 
Drs. Kotrady and Bushnell for the proposition that his 
psychiatric and/or neurological problems are causally related 
to his alleged head injury. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 4 & 5.) 
In contrast, at least five other doctors gave opinions that 
conflicted with the opinions of Drs. Bushnell and Kotrady. 
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(See e.g., R. at 383-488, 490-540, 583-607, 645-646, 648-650, 
707-708, 724-726.) More importantly, the conclusions of 
Drs. Bushnell and Kotrady were based on Mr. Wilstead's 
subjective history of his injury. The Administrative Law Judge 
specifically noted this fact: 
[Mr. Wilstead] has sought to rely on the 
reports of Dr. Kotrady and Dr. Bushnell 
for the proposition that he is entitled to 
workers compensation benefits for an 
alleged head injury on October 28, 1986. 
However, it must be born [sic] in mind that 
the doctors have relied solely on 
[Mr. Wilstead's] history of his injury. 
Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge is 
not bound by their opinion in that respect, 
since it is the sole [province] of the 
Administrative Law Judge, as the trier of 
fact, to determine if [Mr. Wilstead] in 
fact, sustained a head injury on 
October 28, 1986. For the reasons 
previously indicated, I find that no head 
injury occurred on October 28, 1986. 
(R. at 763.) 
The responsibility to resolve conflicting medical 
evidence is indisputably vested in the administrative law 
judge. Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 237, 241 
(Utah 1987) (rejecting an argument on appeal that the 
administrative law judge erred by choosing not to adopt the 
medical panel report on the issue of medical causation). In 
the present case, the Administrative Law Judge properly 
reviewed the numerous medical records and opinions in arriving 
-26-
at his conclusion. Following the Utah Supreme Court's 
direction in Lancaster, the Administrative Law Judge weighed 
the arguably conflicting medical evidence and concluded that 
Mr. Wilstead's complaints were unrelated to the alleged 
industrial accident. (R. at 763.) 
Finally, it is important that Mr. Wilstead, through 
counsel, expressly asked the Administrative Law Judge to 
resolve the conflicting medical evidence and did not request 
the court to submit the matter to a medical panel. (R. at 
171.) In his closing statement, Mr. Wilstead's attorney 
stated: "I believe it's best just to allow the Court to resolve 
[the conflicting medical evidence]." Id. Therefore, 
Mr. Wilstead has waived the right to allege error regarding 
the manner in which the Administrative Law Judge resolved the 
medical evidence. USX Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n., 119 
Utah Adv. Rep. 86, 88 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the 
failure to object to the medical panel report before the 
Industrial Commission precluded review on appeal). See 
also, Pease, 694 P.2d at 618; Rhodes, 681 P.2d at 1249. 
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POINT V 
SINCE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE FOUND THAT 
NO HEAD INJURY OCCURRED, THERE WAS NO CONFLICTING 
MEDICAL EVIDENCE TO SUBMIT TO A MEDICAL PANEL. 
The opinions of Dr. Kotrady and Bushnell presume 
that Mr. Wilstead experienced some sort of head trauma or 
concussion. (R. at 553-555, 610-611.) The contrary medical 
reports presume that Mr. Wilsteadfs "flashback" head injury 
did not occur as alleged. (See e.g., Record at 402.) 
Thus, the medical opinions diverge because the underlying 
factual basis — i.e., whether or not there was a head 
injury — diverge. 
It is the responsibility of an administrative law 
judge to decide the underlying facts. In fact, it is 
reversible error for an administrative law judge to allow a 
medical panel to speculate regarding the underlying basic 
facts. Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 731 P.2d 
1079, 1084 (Utah 1986) (specifically directing administrative 
law judges to resolve all factual disputes before submitting 
medical issues to medical panels). 
In the present case, the Administrative Law Judge 
found that no head injury occurred. Accordingly, he accepted 
those medical opinions that presumed this finding of fact and 
he rejected those medical opinions which presumed that 
Mr. Wilstead had injured his head in an accident. Because 
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those medical opinions that presumed the correct finding of 
fact were not in conflict, a medical panel would not have 
helped resolve this case. 
In summary, neither Mr. Wilstead nor his counsel 
requested that this case be submitted to a medical panel. On 
this appeal, however, Mr. Wilstead argues that the 
Administrative Law Judge should have nevertheless foreseen that 
he would be advancing this claim on appeal. Respondents submit 
that an administrative law judge should not be charged with 
second-guessing an applicant's express request, particularly 
when the applicant is represented by counsel. Additionally, 
Respondents respectfully point out that Mr. Wilstead, not the 
Administrative Law Judge, bore the burden of proving his case. 
Accordingly, the Administrative Law Judge did not err in 
exercising his statutorily mandated discretion not to submit 
this matter to a medical panel. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 
(Repl. 1989) (indicating that judges "may,11 in their 
discretion, refer medical conflicts to medical panels). 
POINT VI 
MR. WILSTEADfS CLAIM FOR TEMPORARY PARTIAL 
DISABILITY BENEFITS IS UNTENABLE. 
Mr. Wilstead claims to be entitled to temporary 
partial disability benefits pursuant to Utah Code 
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Annotated § 35-1-65.1 (Repl. 1989). (Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 13-14.) Temporary partial benefits are designed to 
supplement an employee's income where the employee returns to 
work part-time or at a reduced wage prior to reaching maximum 
medical improvement. Thus, the temporary partial disability 
statute only becomes operational if the employee sustains 
post-injury wage loss. To accomplish this, Section 35-1-65.1 
provides that such an employee is entitled to receive 
two-thirds of the difference between what the employee was 
making before the accident and what he or she is able to earn 
after the accident. 
Based on an unambiguous reading of the statute, 
Mr. Wilstead's claim for temporary partial benefits is wholly 
without merit. Mr. Wilstead testified that he continued to 
work following the alleged accident until December 29, 1986. 
(R. at 342-343.) During this period of time, Mr. Wilstead 
testified that his average monthly wage was $6,606.00. (R. at 
340.) Mr. Wilstead then started working for Valley Transport 
of Huntington, Utah. (R. at 762.) At both jobs, 
Mr. Wilstead earned wages far in excess of the State 
Average Weekly Wage. (The applicable State Average Weekly Wage 
at the time of Mr. Wilstead's alleged accident was $329.00 
per week.) Therefore, in light of the definition of temporary 
-30 
partial disability and according to his own sworn testimony, 
Mr. Wilstead is not entitled to temporary partial benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
To be entitled to any benefits, Mr. Wilstead bears 
the burden of proving that the Administrative Law Judge's 
Findings of Fact are not supported by the record. In contrast, 
a review of the Administrative Law Judge's Order shows that he 
carefully and thoroughly considered all of the evidence that 
was before him. Based on the foregoing, respondents 
respectfully submit that Mr. Wilstead has not sustained his 
burden on this appeal. 
DATED this 11th day of December, 1989. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Michael E. Dy£r 
Brao-C. Betebenner 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents West Way Motor 
Freight and Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case Mo. 88000915 
* 
EKJROL WILSTEAD, * 
Applicant, * FINDINGS OF FACT 
Vt. * CONCLUSIONS OF LAV 
WEST WAY MOTOR FREIGHT and/or * AND ORDER 
LIBERTY MUTUAL and * 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND * 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334• Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on March 16, 
1989 at 1:00 p.m. o'clock. Said hearing was pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present and represented by Jory 
Trease, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Michael Dyer, 
Attorney at Law. 
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by Erie 
V. Boorman, Administrator. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was taken 
under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge. Being fully advised in the 
premises, the Administrative Law Judge is prepared to enter the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant herein, Errol A. Wilstead, was called and testified 
that he was born on October 6, 1941, and that he is presently involved in his 
third marriage. The applicant testified that when he was seventeen years of 
age, he joined the United States Navy and served there from 1959 through 
1963. The applicant was a boatswain mate, which involved operating a water 
taxi. The applicant testified that while operating a landing craft in a 
typhoon, his eyes were burned by the salt and wind, such that his vision was 
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reduced. After his discharge from the service, the applicant worked for the 
Armstrong Rubber Company for a period of time operating a rubber mixing 
machine. In 1964, the applicant was a truck driver at the Job's Valley Dam 
site. In 1965, he moved to California and worked for Martin and Martin 
Construction. The applicant was there until December of 1967, when he 
sustained an industrial accident to his back. Eventually, the applicant 
received a laminectomy at the L4 level on his back in April of 1968. The 
applicant returned to Utah, and sustained his next industrial injury on 
January 16, 1975, while employed by Peabody Coal. At that time, a rock fell 
out of the top of the mine shaft onto the applicant's head, injuring his head, 
right ear, right shoulder, and fracturing the L-l vertebrae. A settlement was 
reached by the parties, and the applicant received a 20% permanent partial 
impairment rating of the whole body. The applicant returned to work in May of 
1978, doing trucking, and in August of 1978, returned to U.S. Fuel Company as 
a laborer in the mines. In August of 1979, the applicant was walking through 
a low entry in a bent over position, when he hit his head on a steel belt 
hanger, which knocked him to the ground causing an intense pain in his neck 
and between his shoulder blades. The applicant did not quit work that day, 
but continued to have pain down his neck, into his back and down both legs. 
The applicant worked up until October of 1979, although he did have pain 
between the shoulder blades and down his left arm. 
On October 24, 1979, the applicant was working for U.S. Fuel, when a 
24 foot rib tipped over causing Mr. Wilstead to jump quickly out of the way. 
This fast movement caused pain in his back and down both his legs, which he 
described as being very similar to that which he experienced after his 1968 
injury. The applicant received temporary total compensation and was off work 
until December 12, 1979. He returned to work on that date, and had worked 
only six hours when a chunk of rock hit him on the left side of his head and 
shoulder knocking him down. The applicant was carried out of the mine on a 
stretcher and was taken to the emergency room. The applicant continued to 
have pain which he described as the same pain, no greater or less, as he was 
having before December 12, 1979. At the applicant's own request he was 
released and returned to work in February of 1980. The applicant had an 
Industrial Commission hearing with respect to his claim of December 12, 1979, 
and the Commission, on December 18, 1981, entered its order finding that the 
applicant had sustained a 12 week period of temporary total disability as the 
result of the industrial accident of December 12, 1979. The Commission also 
found that since the applicant had previously been compensated for 20% 
impairment of the whole person, and that the medical panel convened following 
the December 12, 1979, had found that the applicant's condition had actually 
improved to 171 of the whole person, the Commission found that the applicant 
was not entitled to any further permanent physical impairment benefits. Mo 
objections having been filed to that order, it became the final award of the 
Commission. 
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Either in October of 1981, or October of 1983, the applicant 
purchased his own eighteen wheeler truck, and was self-employed as a owner 
operator trucker. While so employed as a trucker, the applicant signed a 
lease with Westway Freight. The applicant alleges that while driving for 
Westway Freight on October 28, 1986, he sustained a compensable industrial 
accident while at the Roadrunner truck stop in Phoenix, Arizona. The 
applicant testified that there was some fuel on the ground, and that he 
slipped and fell as a result, and struck his low back and the back of his head 
on the curb of the fuel pump island. On direct examination, the applicant 
testified that he did not know if he fell at the northwest truck yard, which 
was approximately 2,000 yards from the Roadrunner truck stop in addition to 
his fall at Roadrunner or not. The applicant allowed that he had fallen and 
hit his back at Roadrunner and that he had a loss of consciousness which then 
resulted in severe headaches. The applicant testified that he continued 
working and drove on to Blythe, California, where he reported to the emergency 
room with low back pain and severe headaches according to the applicant. The 
applicant then testified that after he stayed in Blythe for three days, he was 
then dispatched to Los Angeles and then from there to Haywood, California, and 
then from there onto Denver, Colorado. The applicant testified that he 
stopped in his home in the vicinity of Price, Utah, and picked up his brother, 
who also helped him drive the truck. 
The applicant eventually returned from Colorado, and continued 
working for Westway until December of 1986, when he discontinued his 
employment. In February of 1987, the applicant was driving for Valley 
Transport of Huntington, Utah. While on the road back east, on February 13, 
1987, the applicant had a sudden stabbing pain on the right side of his head 
behind his right eye which was accompanied with right side of the face 
numbness. The applicant reported to the Lincoln County Hospital which 
diagnosed his problem as anxiety neurosis. The applicant returned to Salt 
Lake City and was admitted to the University of Utah Hospital where he was 
seen by Dr. Matsuo and Dr. Halibraum. The doctors concluded that there was no 
pathological basis for the applicant's headaches. Dr. Matsuo then referred 
the applicant to Dr. Bushnell at the Western Institute of Neuropsychiatry. 
The applicant has continued under the care of Dr. Bushnell, and he is also 
being treated by Dr. Kotrady at the Emery Medical Center. 
On cross-examination, the applicant testified that when he hit his 
back on the fuel island curb, he saw bright lights. The applicant in one 
instance testified that he was sure he hit his head at the Roadrunner yard, 
yet on page 23 of his deposition the applicant could not recall hitting his 
head on anything. At the hearing, the applicant indicated that he felt pain 
in his head and assumed he hit his head. He further indicated that he told 
the medical personnel at the Blythe Emergency Hospital that he was having 
severe pain in his head and back. He also testified that he noted a large 
bump four or five days later on the back of his head, which was pointed out to 
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him by his wife. The applicant further testified that on November 11, 1986, 
he saw his chiropractor, Dr. Sanders, and that he told Dr. Sanders that he had 
severe headaches. On further cross-examination, the applicant denied telling 
Dr. Ramirez of the Emery Medical Center that he was on the verge of 
bankruptcy. The applicant admitted that from 1975 forward he has had one 
headache per week on an average. The applicant also testified that he worked 
as an insurance agent for approximately 11 months in 1983, and that he knew 
the insurance business inside and out. On re-direct, the applicant testified 
that his back pain has increased since the industrial accident of October 28, 
1986, and further indicated that his low back pain became constant three or 
four months after the industrial accident of October 28, 1986. 
The crucial element of this case involves the credibility of the 
applicant, since the alleged injury of October 28, 1986, was unwitnessed. 
Giving the applicant the benefit of the doubt, I find that he did slip and 
fall on or about October 28, 1986, while at the Roadrunner truck stop in 
Phoenix, Arizona. However, I do not believe that the applicant sustained an 
injury to the back of his head at that time. The applicant contends that he 
has received a "flash back*9 which involved a mental picture of himself 
striking the back of his head on the fuel island curb. The applicant 
testified that he informed Dr. Kotrady of this -flash back** yet the 
Administrative Law Judge can find no reference whatsoever in Dr. Kotradyvs 
records of that "flash back". In fact when the applicant was seen by Dr. 
Kotrady on February 22, 1987, he made no mention at all of injuring his head 
on October 28, 1986. In his Industrial Commission 123 report dated February 
27, 1987, Dr. Kotrady reports that he first saw the applicant on February 22, 
1987. In the top portion of the form, which appears to have been completed by 
the applicant, box six, which is the "worker's statement of cause of injury or 
illness:" the applicant has the following entry. "Slipped and fell on truck 
stop fuel island injuring back § LI (comp fracture)". Under the complaint 
section is listed "high blood pressure, nervous disorders, speech, vission 
(sic) coordination, severe headaches and possible aneurysum (sic)". Dr. 
Kotrady made a diagnosis that a post traumatic intra cranial aneurysum should 
be ruled out. Thereafter, the applicant was referred to Dr. Kirkpatrick for 
further evaluation. It is interesting to note that Dr. Kirkpatrick was told 
by the applicant that he struck the back of his head at the truck stop. Yet 
on April 21, 1987, while the applicant was at the University of Utah Hospital 
he gave Dr. Matsuo a completely different history. The records of Dr. Matsuo 
indicate that the applicant was complaining to the doctor of two different 
types of headaches. The first headache described by the applicant was 
"chronic, nearly daily bilateral occipital-frontal 2-5 dating back to head 
trauma with laceration and loss of consciousness while at work 1975-this is 
well controlled and does not interfere with daily activities on aspirin or 
Tylenol". The doctor then goes on to describe the applicant's second type of 
headache, which he describes as being on the applicant's right temporal area, 
and he described it "like shot with a bebe" which is amazingly the same 
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description the applicant repeated at the evidentiary hearing. The doctor 
noted that this right side headache consisted of two separate episodes, with 
the first episode having a sudden onset on February 13, 1987, while the 
applicant was driving truck in Missouri. Or. Matsuo reports the applicant had 
no further headaches like this on the right side of his head until the early 
morning of April 18, 19879 when the applicant awoke with hemmoroid pain.9* The 
doctor reports that the applicant "went to toilet and passed gas and then 
noted acute right temporal pain. The doctor went on to note that the 
applicant had a several month history of increased anxiety "which he dates to 
back injury 10/86." However, there is no mention in Dr. Matsuo*s reports of 
any flash back that the applicant had just two months prior with respect to 
his alleged head injury of October 28, 1986. Dr. Matsuo concluded that the 
applicant had two problems preventing him from returning to work. First, that 
the aneurysum would need to be ruled out and secondly that the various 
stresses that the applicant was under would need to be reduced. The applicant 
received further treatment and was informed by Dr. Halibraum that there was no 
organic basis for his complaints of headaches. 
The inconsistency in the applicant's complaints as compared to the 
medical reports of those complaints is also illustrated by the initial 
treatment received by the applicant at the Blythe Emergency Hospital. The 
applicant testified that he informed the hospital that he was having severe 
headaches, and that he had struck his head at the time of his injury. Yet the 
report of the Blythe Hospital contains no mention whatsoever of any history of 
a head injury by the applicant. Those records indicate that the applicant's 
chief complaint was that "fell and hurt back-pain getting steadily worse.vv 
The report goes on to indicate that the applicant checked into the emergency 
room at approximately 9:28 a.m. and was discharged at 12:10, or before he had 
been there a full 3 hours. The applicant testified that he was in the 
hospital all day. The report goes on to relate that the applicant fell and 
hit his lower back against the fuel pump and that the applicant was having 
trouble bending and moving around in general. The applicant notified the 
hospital that since the injury occurred he had experienced progressive 
increase in pain, but he denied any numbness or tingling in his lower 
extremities. The applicant was given a physical examination and x-rays, and 
the final diagnosis was that he had sustained an acute strain and bruising of 
the L4-5 lower back. The applicant was instructed to have bed rest with warm 
soaks to his back with a follow up visit to the physical medicine department. 
The applicant was discharged in satisfactory condition. On October 31, 1986, 
the radiologist report was received by the emergency room, which indicated 
that the applicant had a compressed fracture of LI. The hospital then 
informed the applicant's wife by telephone of their findings. The radiology 
report also indicated that the applicant was post laminectomy at LA-5, and 
that he had hypertrophic degenerative changes of L3-4 and 5 with associated 
narrowing of the joint spaces in that region. 
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The applicant's next medical treatment occurred with his 
chiropractor, Dr. Ronald Sanders, who saw the applicant on November 11, 1986. 
The doctor1s records indicate that he treated the- applicant for a compression 
fracture of LI. The applicant testified that he informed Dr. Sanders of his 
injury, and that he also complained of severe headaches as a result thereof. 
However, the patient up date form contained in Dr. Sanders' records which was 
filled out by the applicant on November 11, 1986, indicates that the applicant 
sustained an injury on October 30, 1986, at 1:30 a.m., when he slipped on an 
oil spill on a truck stop fuel island and injured back. The applicant's 
symptoms which he reported to the doctor were: '•low back injury LI." In that 
report, there is no mention at all by Mr. Vilstead of any alleged head 
injury. In the doctor's report that accompanies the patient update form, 
again there is no mention of any injury to the back of the head, but rather an 
injury to the low back. In fact on March 11, 1987, the applicant still had 
not mentioned any type of head injury to Dr. Sanders. Rather, the applicant 
reported on a patient update form dated March 11, 1987, that his present 
symptoms were **low back, mid-back and neck pain, severe nervous condition". 
The next item under recent falls indicates "pain in right temporal and pain 
behind right eye February 13, 1987, pain started immediate. No trauma but 
felt sharp stabbing pain, made nauseated. Right side of face was numb. Right 
arm had spasms and right leg". Again, there is no mention by Mr. Wilstead of 
any alleged flash back or any other memory enhancing mechanism concerning an 
alleged head injury on October 28, 1986. In fact, the doctor's office notes 
are very telling in this respect, as indicated in the doctor's office note of 
November 25, 1986, and in the office note of September 30, 1987. In the 
office note of November 25, 1986, it is noted "note to Brrol asking for 
payment for charges since he had not provided information to send report to 
industrial". In a letter dated March 19, 1987, to Liberty Mutual, Dr. Sanders 
indicates that the applicant was instructed "on his first visit to this office 
that information on the injury, employer and insurance carrier would be 
required in order for us to submit the reports necessary for an industrial 
injury on a timely basis. After several attempts to attain this information, 
none of which were successful, we informed Mr. Wilstead that he would be 
required to pay for the charges incurred. Several weeks passed before he 
recently supplied us with the name of his employer and your insurance 
company". It should be noted that the physician's first report of injury 
which was submitted by Dr. Sanders lists Northwest Transport as the employer, 
and lists an injury date of October 31, 1986. Further, that report indicates 
that as of March 19, 1987, the applicant still had not received his flash 
back, and accordingly was still indicating only "slipped on oil spill at truck 
stop and fell injuring back"* The applicant apparently had continuing 
communications with Dr. Sanders, and eventually on September 30, 1987, the 
following office note is contained in the doctor's records: 
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I talked to Dee today. Errol is still having pain in the 
skull. He has had CT scans and angiograms of the head and 
no definite source of his pain has been found. She was 
wanting to find out if anything was mentioned about head 
pain when he came in for his industrial injury in November 
of last year. I told her that no complaint was mentioned 
relating to a head injuryf and I told her it didn't look 
like they would be able to tie the headaches to his 
industrial accident. 
Rather than prolong this opinion with further examples of 
discrepencies, suffice it to say that the Administrative Law Judge has serious 
problems with the credibility of the applicant regarding an alleged head 
injury on or about October 28, 1986. In this respect, the applicant testified 
that his wife felt a large bump on the back of his head four or five days 
later, but yet the only evidence of that discovery is the applicant's own 
testimony, since the applicant did not see fit to have his wife testify. I 
should also note that after receiving an examination at the Blythe Emergency 
Hospital, the physician in charge could find no evidence of this bump which 
was discovered by the applicant's wife. 
Having had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the applicant, 
I conclude that he most likely did slip and fall on or about October 28, 1986, 
however the applicant's injury which he sustained at that time was a temporary 
aggravation of his well documented long standing pre-existing back problems. 
The applicant testified that he had been informed that he had sustained a 
compression fracture at LI as a result of his fall of October 28, 1986. 
However, it is clear that the medical personnel at the Blythe Hospital did not 
have the benefit of the applicant's voluminous medical records, because with 
the benefit of those records, the medical providers would have gleaned that 
the applicant's compression fracture at LI was actually long standing having 
been previously diagnosed as early as 1975, by Dr. Chester Powell. The 
radiology report taken at the time of his treatment in Blythe, indicates that 
the applicant incurred no new pathological damage as the result of that slip 
and fall. Rather, the applicant sustained a temporary aggravation, which was 
treated successfully with bed rest initially. The applicant returned to Utah 
and was seen by his chiropractor, Dr. Sanders, but was not taken off work by 
the doctor. Rather, the applicant continued working until he had anxiety 
attack in December because of his worries about an impending bankruptcy as 
recorded in the records of Dr. Ramirez. The applicant then terminated his 
employment and once he had stabilized his condition with respect to the chest 
pains and other anxiety complaints he was having, he then started working 
again for Valley Transport of Huntington, Utah. With respect to his 
complaints of headaches resulting from the injury of October 28, 1986, the 
preponderance of the evidence is quite clear that the applicant did not have 
the complaints of severe headaches until February 13, 1987, while he was 
employed by Valley Transport. The applicant's representation that he was 
having headaches in October and November of 1986, due to a head injury on 
October 28, 1986, is not supported by preponderance of the medical evidence on 
the file. Rather, the preponderance of the medical evidence supports a 
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finding that the applicant had a sudden onset of right temporal pain on 
February 13, 1987, and that those headaches had ,as their most likely source 
anxiety and stress. The applicant has sought to rely on the reports of Dr. 
Kotrady and Dr. Bushnell for the proposition that he is entitled to workers 
compensation benefits for an alleged head injury on October 28, 1986. 
However, it must be born in mind that the doctors have relied solely on the 
applicant's history of his injury. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge is 
not bound by their opinion in that respect, since it is the sole promise of 
the Administrative Law Judge, as the trier of fact, to determine if the 
applicant in fact sustained a head injury on October 28, 1986. For the 
reasons previously indicated, I find that no head injury occurred on October 
28, 1986. The applicant sustained a temporary aggravation of his long 
standing pre-existing low back problem, which physical impairment was not 
increased as the result of the slip and fall of October 28, 1986. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Brrol Wilstead sustained a temporary aggravation to his low back on 
October 28, 1986, while employed by Westway Motor Freight, with no permanent 
impairment resulting therefrom. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for additional 
medical expenses, temporary total compensation and permanent partial 
impairment benefits and permanent total benefits as the result of the 
industrial accident of October 28, 1986, should be, and the same is hereby 
dismissed, since the applicant has failed to sustain his burden of proof that 
the industrial accident of October 28, 1986, resulted in any permanent 
impairment or permanent total disability. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
/ Timothy C^Affisn 
1/ Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
J{ 7&* day of March, 1989. 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 88000915 
ERROL WILSTEAD, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
WEST WAY MOTOR FREIGHT and/or 
LIBERTY MUTUAL and 
EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE FVUD, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On March 27, 1989, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding the 
applicant in the above-captioned case workers compensation benefits related to 
an October 28, 1986 industrial fall which temporarily aggravated the 
applicant's pre-existing low back condition. The Administrative Law Judge 
denied benefits related to a head injury which was alleged to have occurred as 
a result of the same fall. The Administrative Law Judge found that the 
applicant's testimony regarding the head injury was not credible because of 
internal inconsistencies in the testimony and also because the testimony was 
not consistent with medical records for the treatment the applicant received 
contemporaneously with the October 28, 1986 fall. 
On April 7, 1989, pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-82.53, the applicant filed 
a Motion for Review pro se. The applicant indicates in his Motion for Review 
that he requests review because he has been diagnosed as permanently totally 
disabled due to brain damage. 
The Commission finds that the only issue on review is whether the 
Administrative Law Judge correctly assessed the evidence with respect to the 
alleged head injury on October 28, 1986. The Commission adopts the Findings 
of Fact as stated by the Administrative Law Judge in the March 27, 1989 Order. 
The Commission has reviewed both the medical evidence and the Administrative 
Law Judge's findings with respect to the applicant's testimony. The Commission 
agrees with the Administrative Law Judge that the applicant has not been 
consistent in his descriptions of how the head injury occurred. In addition, 
none of the medical records prepared just following the date of injury 
mentioned a head injury or headaches. The Commission prefers to defer to the 
Administrative Law Judge in credibility questions because the Administrative 
Law Judge has the opportunity to assess the applicant's demeanor while 
testifying. In this case, the Administrative Law Judge found the applicant's 
testimony to be non-credible. Finally, the Commission finds that the medical 
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evidence in this case is conflicting with respect to whether the alleged head 
injury could possibly medically cause the applicant's current psychiatric 
and/or neurological problems. Based on these considerations9 the Commission 
finds that the Administrative Law Judge was correct in determining that no 
head injury occurred on October 28, 1986. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's April 7, 1989 Motion for 
Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge*s March 27, 1989 Order is 
hereby affirmed and final with appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals within 
thirty (30) days as specified in U.C.A. 63-46b-12, U.C.A. 63-46b-14 and U.C.A. 
35-1-86. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
U^L 
Dixie L. ttins 
Commissioner 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah^Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
lay of June, 1989. 
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